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1. INTRODUCTION
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade' ("General Agree-
ment") is the paramount multilateral treaty on international trade in
goods. Developed by Western nations in 1948 during the cooperative
period following World War II,2 the General Agreement encourages
the free flow of worldwide trade in goods by reducing domestic trade
barriers to foreign imports.' When the rules of the General Agreement
* J.D. Candidate 1990, University of Pennsylvania; B.S. 1985, University of
Virginia.
I General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1948)
[hereinafter GATT]. The text of the General Agreement has been modified and sup-
plemented since 1947. The current version is contained in 4 GATT, Basic Instruments
and Selected Documents [hereinafter BISD] (1969).
"General Agreement" conventionally refers to the agreement. "GATT" refers to
the organization and collectively to the organization and its agreements.
2 See Ehrenhaft, A U.S. View of the GATT, 14 INT'L Bus. LAW 146, 46 (1986).
See also Yeutter, An Agenda for the New GATT Round, in LAW AND PRACTICE
UNDER THE GATT [hereinafter LAW & PRACTICE] III at (K. Simmons & B. Hill ed.
Jan. 1988) (Address by United States Trade Representative, Clayton Yeutter before
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (Sept. 10, 1986) [hereinafter C. Yeutter].
GATT was originally designed as a temporary measure to govern world trade
while the International Trade Organization (ITO) was established. When the ITO
proposal was not approved by the United States Congress, GATT became the sole and
permanent arbiter of world trade. Recent Developments, International Trade: The
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 29 HARV. INT'L L.J. 199, 199 n. 1 (1988).
See generally TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER FUTURE at 157-160 (1987) [hereinafter
LEUTWILER REPORT].
For in-depth discussions of the history of GATT and the General Agreement, see
generally J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969); R. HUDEC,
THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (1975); K. DAM, THE
GATT - LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970).
3 J. ARONSON & P. COWHEY, TRADE IN SERVICES: A CASE FOR OPEN MAR-
KETS 24 (1984). There are three basic concepts underlying GATT. The cornerstone of
the General Agreement is "Most-Favored-Nation treatment" (MFN), which mandates
that each contracting party accord equal treatment to all other contracting parties.
GATT, supra note, at art. I. The "national treatment" doctrine calls for the equal
internal taxation and regulation of foreign and domestic products. GATT, supra note
1, at art. III. The "reciprocity" concept concerns multilateral concessions and mutual
advantages. GATT Preamble. See generally 0. LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN
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are followed, uncertainty in international trade decreases, while inter-
national investment, trade, and economic growth increase.4
Ninety-six nations are "contracting parties" to GATT as signa-
tory members of the General Agreement, and twenty-nine countries are
provisional members.' A de facto organization, referred to as "the
GATT," developed in the early years of GATT to administer the Gen-
eral Agreement.6 Otherwise, the General Agreement does not provide
for a formal governing organization; all administrative powers are le-
gally vested in the Contracting Parties acting as a collective body.'
In September, 1986, trade ministers and representatives from over
70 contracting parties met in Punta del Este, Uruguay, and agreed to
launch the eighth round of global trade negotiations under GATT's
auspices.' The "Uruguay Round" is scheduled to end in December,
1990. During these four years of talks, the contracting parties hope to
reduce barriers to international commerce, limit trade-distorting regula-
tions, strengthen current GATT procedures, and integrate new types of
goods and services into the GATT system.9
THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 8-11 (1985).
" Aho, The Uruguay Round: Will It Revitalize the Trading System?, 11
FLETCHER F. 1, 4 (1987). The United States Trade Representative has claimed that
GATT has "arguably done more over the past 40 years to promote the cause of peace
and prosperity than any other international body." C. Yeutter, supra note 2, at 2.
1 LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 2, Introduction at 28; GATT INFORMATION
AND MEDIA RELATIONS DIVISION, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE:
WHAT IT IS, WHAT IT DOES 2, 22 (1989). Six applications for full membership are
currently pending (China, Costa Rica, Tunisia, Algeria, Bulgaria and Bolivia), as are
three applications for provisional accession (Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala).
Law & Practice, Introduction supra note 2, at 28-29.
6 See supra note 1. The organizational structure is fully described in J. JACKSON,
supra note 2, at 119-62 (1969) and 0. LONG, supra note 3, at 44-54.
1 GATT, supra note 1, at art. XXV. "Contracting Parties," when capitalized,
refers to the parties to the General Agreement acting as a collective body. Uncapital-
ized, the reference denotes the contracting parties acting individually.
8 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, URUGUAY ROUND
PROGRESS REPORT 22 (Dec. 14, 1988). The other GATT rounds were: Geneva (1947)
(establishing GATT); Annency, France (1949); Torquay, Great Britain (1950-51);
Geneva (1955-56); the "Dillon Round" in Geneva (1961-62); the "Kennedy Round" in
Geneva (1964-67); and the "Tokyo Multilateral Trade Negotiations Round" (MTN
Round or Tokyo Round) in Geneva (1973-79). See generally LEUTWiLER REPORT,
supra note 2, at 160-69.
Until the Kennedy Round, talks were aimed at reducing tariffs. Since then, the
objective has been to reduce non-tariff barriers (NTB's). Significant progress was first
made toward this goal during the Tokyo Round, where a series of agreements were
reached regarding non-tariff measures such as subsidies, technical barriers to trade,
import licensing procedures, government procurement practices, customs valuation and
anti-dumping procedures. Id.
9 See Recent Developments, supra note 2, at 199. For a detailed discussion of the
objectives of the Uruguay Round, see generally LEUTWILER REPORT supra note 2; C.
Aho & J. Aronson, TRADE TALKS: AMERICA BETTER LISTEN! (1985).
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Integrating services trade into GATT, either by incorporating ser-
vices into the General Agreement or by creating a side agreement, is
one of the most visible and contentious issues on the negotiating table.
One of the issues that the negotiators must address is the appropriate
method for resolving the disputes that inevitably will arise under the
agreement. Credible dispute resolution procedures are needed to pre-
serve the integrity of whatever agreement is reached."0
An obvious solution, urged by the United States, 1 is to apply all
existing GATT dispute settlement procedures to a services agreement.
However, the contracting parties, including the United States, are dis-
satisfied with various aspects of the current system; reform of GATT's
dispute settlement mechanism is also high on the Uruguay Round
agenda. Although the contracting parties recognize the need for reform
generally, debate exists over the direction that these changes should
take.
The GATT model does provide a useful framework from which to
develop a dispute settlement procedure for a trade in services agree-
ment. Direct extension of GATT procedures to services trade, however,
may be inappropriate or impractical, because trade in services differs
from trade in goods in many ways. 2 For instance, GATT dispute set-
tlement procedures work well for narrowly focused or technical is-
sues, 3 but initial disputes arising under the services agreement likely
would deal with broad questions of general applicability and
10 Overall Approach - New Round of Trade Negotiations - in Defence of Open
Multilateral Trade, adopted by the Council of Ministers of the European Community
following meetings of June 16-17, 1986 [hereinafter In Defence of Open Multilateral
Trade], reprinted in Law & Practice supra note 2, at § III.B.2. at 29. The viability of
the services agreement will depend on its ability to resolve disputes effectively and satis-
factorily. Note, Liberalization of International Trade in the Service Sector: Threshold
Problems and a Proposed Framework Under the GATT, 5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 371,
407 (1982). See also THE URUGUAY ROUND: A HANDBOOK ON THE MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTATIONS 11 (1987) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
"I See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, URUGUAY
ROUND-PROGRESS REPORT 4 (Oct. 18, 1988) [hereinafter PROGRESS REPORT of Oct.
18, 1988]. See also Schott, Protectionist Threat to Trade and Investment in Services, 6
WORLD ECON. 195, 208-09 (1982).
12 J. ARONSON & P. COWHEY, supra note 3, at 24, 28. See also Sauvant, The
International Policy Discussion: International Fora, reprinted in Law & Practice,
supra note 2, § VI at 18-19 (excerpt from International Transactions in Services: The
Politics of Transborder Data Flows, chap. V (1986)).
"S U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Pub. No. 1793, Review of the Effectiveness of Trade
Dispute Settlement under the GATT and the Tokyo Round Agreements 83 (1985) (Re-
port to the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, on Investigation No. 332-212 under
Section 332(g) of the Tariff Act of 1930) [hereinafter ITC Dispute Settlement Study].
Panels are not effective in setting broad policy for each issue they decide. deKieffer,
GATT Dispute Settlements: A New Beginning in International and U.S. Trade Law,
2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 317, 325 (1980).
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jurisdiction.
This Comment explores the wisdom of applying existing GATT
dispute settlement procedures to a new trade in services agreement, spe-
cifically addressing the general philosophical approach that should be
followed in resolving disputes under a services agreement. Part II pro-
vides an overview of GATT's current dispute settlement procedure, its
problems, and its recent improvements. Part III describes the unique
problems that will arise in developing a services agreement, including
both trade and non-trade issues. Part IV examines whether GATT
procedure, as existing or as modified, would be effective in resolving
disputes arising under a trade in services agreement.
2. GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE
2.1. Procedure
The GATT dispute settlement system "is a central element in
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading sys-
tem."'" The aim of the procedures is "to provide an orderly process for
maintaining or restoring the balance of concessions when a contracting
party violates a tariff concession or contravenes one of the rules of the
agreement."15 Hence, the objective of the procedures is not to ensure
compliance with the law, but to arrive at understandings and mutually
acceptable settlements between disputing parties."
A violation can consist of any matter "affecting the operation of
[the General Agreement];' 7 to conduct which the complaining party
considers to be impairing or nullifying "any benefit accruing to it di-
rectly or indirectly under [the Agreement];" or to conduct that is im-
peding the party's attainment of any objective of the Agreement. 8 De-
spite over thirty references to dispute settlement procedure in the
General Agreement, 19 the Agreement contains "no single, sharply de-
"4 Record of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Uruguay Round, Midterm
Meeting [hereinafter Multilateral Trade Negotiations], Trade Negotiations Committee
Doe. MTN.TNC/11 at 24 (April 21, 1989).
ITC Dispute Settlement Study, supra note 13, at 1.
16 See LEurTWILER REPORT, supra note 2, at 120. See also GATT Agreed
Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT in the Field of Dispute Settle-
ment, Annex to Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settle-
ment, and Surveillance, BISD, supra note 1, at 215. 4 (26th Supp. 1980) [hereinafter
Annex].
17 GATT, supra note 1, at art. XXII:1.
'a GATT, supra note 1, at art. XXIII:1.
19 Most provisions provide for consultation, at times exclusively. See, e.g., GATT,
supra note 1, at arts. I1:5, VI:7, VII:1, VIII:2, IX:6, XII:4, XIII:4, XVI:4, XVIII,
XIX:2, XXIV:7, XXVI, XXVIII:1, XXXVII:2 XXXVII:4. See also Davey, Dispute
Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51, 54 (1987).
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fined dispute-settlement procedure."2 Articles XXII and XXIII, the
two provisions most relevant to dispute settlement,21 provide only an
outline of how to handle disputes.22 The 1979 Understanding Regard-
ing Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement, and Surveillance2"
("Understanding") and Agreed Description of the Customary Practice
of the GATT in the Field of Dispute Settlement ("Annex") 24 codified
the informal dispute settlement procedures that had developed through
custom over the previous three decades. Most notably, the Understand-
ing and Annex explicitly recognized the panel process, which had
played a central role in dispute resolution since 1952.25
Dispute settlement under GATT is a quasi-judicial process con-
sisting of five main steps. First, a complaining contracting party must
attempt to settle a dispute over alleged GATT violations through bilat-
eral consultations with the offending contracting party. The offending
government must give the complaining party's request for bilateral con-
sultations "sympathetic consideration. '2 If bilateral consultation fails
20 J. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 164.
21 Id. at 166. GATT, supra note 1, at Article XXII (Consultation) provides for
consultation on 'any matter violating the Agreement. See GATT, supra note 1, at art.
XXII:1.
GATT, supra note 1, at Article XXIII (Nullification or Impairment) covers situ-
ations where a contracting party considers "that any benefit accruing to it directly or
indirectly under [the General Agreement] is being nullified or impaired or that the
attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of (a) the
failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations. . ., (b) the application
by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provi-
sions of this Agreement, or (c) the existence of any other situation. . . ." GATT art.
XXIII:l. Subsection (a) refers to specific violations of the General Agreement, while
subsections (b) and (c) offer protection against government measures that, even if not in
violation of specific GATT obligations, nullify or impair indirect benefits provided
under the GATT. GATT, supra note 1, at art. XXIII; J. JACKSON, supra note 2, at
179-80.
While not all violations under Article XXIII fall under Article XXII, any viola-
tion of the Agreement under Article XXII is prima facie a violation under Article
XXIII. Annex, supra note 16, at 4-5.
22 Davey, supra note 19, at 57.
22 Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance, BISD, supra note 1, at 210 (26th Supp. 1980) [hereinafter
Understanding].
24 See Annex, supra note 16.
25 ITC Dispute Settlement Study, supra note 13, at 27-28. The nine agreements
reached during the Tokyo Round contain independent provisions for dispute settlement.
While the dispute mechanisms generally follow those used for the General Agreement,
certain procedures are more rigorous, such as the use of recommended timetables for
each step of the process. Id. at vii.
For an overview of the dispute settlement procedure, see generally LEUTWILER
REPORT, supra note 2, at 119-135.
26 "Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall
afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as may be
made by another contracting party with respect to any matter affecting the operation of
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to settle the dispute, either party may seek the good offices of the Di-
rector-General of GATT or another appropriate party for assistance.
27
If neither consultation nor the use of good offices results in a satis-
factory settlement, the complaining party may then refer the matter to
the Contracting Parties or to the GATT Council, which is empowered
to act for the Contracting Parties.2" The complaining party may also
request that a panel or working party be established to assist the Con-
tracting Parties in evaluating the dispute.29 Although the right to a
panel is not automatic and requires approval by a consensus of the
Contracting Parties, apparently no request has ever been refused.30
The function of a panel is to "review the facts of a case and the
applicability of GATT provisions and to arrive at an objective assess-
ment" of the dispute.3" The panel then prepares an advisory report to
the Contracting Parties, detailing its findings and recommendations for
[the] Agreement." GATT, supra note 1, at art. XXII:1. The parties also have the
option of requesting multilateral consultation with the Contracting Parties if bilateral
consultation proves unsuccessful. GATT, supra note 1, at art. XXII:2.
Pursuant to GATT Article XXIII, a complaining party "may, with a view to
satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written representations or proposals to the
[allegedly infringing contracting party or parties]. Any contracting party thus ap-
proached shall give sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals made
to it." GATT, supra note 1, at art. XXIII:1. See also Understanding, supra note 23,
at 4.
27 Understanding, supra note 23, at 1 8.
"8 Annex, supra note 16, at 11 n. 1. Future references to "Contracting Parties"
will refer as well to the GATT Council.
2 If "a contracting party invoking Article XXIII:2 requests the establishment of a
panel to assist the Contracting Parties to deal with the matter, the Contracting Parties
[will] decide on its establishment in accordance with standing practice. . . .[S]uch re-
quests [will] be granted only after the contracting party concerned [has] had an oppor-
tunity to study the complaint and respond to it before the Contracting Parties." Under-
standing, supra note 1, at 10.
Panels are the procedure typically employed; since 1953, only three working par-
ties have been convened. Annex at 6(ii); Petersmann, International and European
Foreign Trade Law: GATT Dispute Settlement Proceedings Against the EEC, 22
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 441, 469 n.71 (1985). A "panel" generally consists of three or
five independent experts, most often members of third-party GATT delegations who
are to act in their individual, not governmental, capacities. Understanding, supra note
23, at $1 11, 14.
A "working party" is opened to all interested contracting parties and typically
consists of five to twenty participants including the disputants. Annex, supra note 16,
at % 6(i). Working parties are less "formal" than panels.
20 See Understanding, supra note 23, at % 10; Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement
After the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 175 n.
88 (1980). Some requests have been deferred and eventually "dropped," however. Id.
"i Annex, supra note 16, at % 3. See also infra notes 54, 186 and accompanying
text (terms of reference slightly modified at Montreal meeting). The function of the
panel is to interpret the General Agreement, not to "state the law" in the manner of
courts or arbitral tribunals. LEUTWILER REPORT, supra note 2, at 122. A summary of
the panel procedure can be found in the Annex at paragraph six.
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resolution of the dispute. The report generally should include the
panel's rationale. The panel report itself is not binding upon the Con-
tracting Parties and does not establish legal precedent.3" A draft of the
report is first submitted to the disputants for comment, with the intent
of provoking a voluntary settlement. If settlement is reached, the
panel's final report to the Contracting Parties briefly states the facts of
the case and notes that a settlement was reached."3
If settlement is not reached, the Contracting Parties, including the
disputing parties, decide by consensus either to adopt, modify or reject
the panel's report and recommendations. Theoretically, the parties to
the dispute are not to obstruct the process. Although a majority vote
can always replace consensus,' the General Agreement's one-nation/
one-vote procedure has never been used. As a result, a losing party can
delay adoption of the panel report indefinitely. Upon adoption, the
panel report takes on legal force under Article XXIII:2 and "entail[s] a
legal obligation to withdraw any measure inconsistent with GATT."3
After the Contracting Parties adopt the findings and recommenda-
tions of the panel, the "guilty" party decides whether and in what
manner it will comply with the recommendations. A party that is sanc-
tioned also has the drastic option of withdrawing from GATT.3 7 If the
complaining party is not satisfied with the compliance efforts, it may
raise the issue with the Contracting Parties. 8 As a last resort, the win-
ning party may request authorization to retaliate against the offending
party by suspending certain concessions or obligations with respect to
that party under Article XXIII:2.3 Retaliation has been used only
once.4" Recourse to retaliatory sanctions is not in keeping with the aim
3" But see infra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
33 Understanding, supra note 23, at 16-18; Annex, supra note 16, 6. The
panel encourages the disputing parties to reach a voluntary settlement throughout the
panel process. Id.
34 See GATT, supra note 1, at art. XXV:4.
3 See Davey, supra note 19, at 85.
36 Petersmann, supra note 29, at 470. The Contracting Parties have adopted
panel reports almost invariably without amendment or extensive discussion. Id.
17 GATT, supra note 1, at art. XXIII:2.
38 Understanding, supra note 23, at 1 22. The Contracting Parties "shall keep
under surveillance any matter on which they have made recommendations or given
rulings." Id.
' GATT, supra note 1, at art. XXIII:2. To suspend obligations means to impose
otherwise prohibited trade restrictions.
"' Annex, supra note 16 at 4. In 1955, in the "U.S. Dairy Quotas" case,
GATT found that U.S. quotas on imports of dairy products violated Article XXIII,
resulting in injury to the Netherlands. When the United States refused to remove the
quotas, GATT permitted the Netherlands to impose quotas on wheat imports from the
United States. GATT, Suspension of Certain Obligations to the United States by the
Kingdom of the Netherlands, BISD, supra note 1, at 31-32 (4th Supp. 1956) [herein-
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of the dispute settlement procedure, which is to restore the balance of
concessions between the parties,4x not to punish the offender.4
While other provisions of the General Agreement permit govern-
ments to withdraw or suspend obligations unilaterally without prior
authorization in order to restore the balance of reciprocity, contracting
parties rarely resort to such sanctions."8 Article XIX, for example, au-
thorizes governments to impose emergency barriers against imports that
are causing serious injury to domestic markets.4 When used, these pro-
visions serve the same purpose as retaliation under Article XXIII.45
2.2. Problems
During the first decade of GATT's existence, the dispute settle-
ment procedure showed considerable promise and was perceived as suc-
cessful.46 In the 1960's and early 1970's, however, governments hesi-
tated or refused to invoke Article XXIII procedures, believing that they
were ineffective.47 Since the late 1970's, the system seems to have
gained renewed favor,48 although many believe the system remains
"woefully inadequate.1 49 Critics note that the system has handled only
minor issues successfully in recent years; the tougher and more conten-
tious disputes remain unresolved. 5° The mandate for the Uruguay
Round is to improve and strengthen the rules and procedures of the
dispute settlement process, especially those regarding compliance with
adopted recommendations, "in order to ensure prompt and effective res-
after U.S. v. Netherlands]; Note, Current Efficacy of the GATT Dispute Settlement
Process, 22 TEx. INT'L L.J. 87, 97 (1986).
4 LEUTWILER REPORT, supra note 2, at 102.
42 Id.
"s R. HUDEC, supra note 2, at 182-83. These remedies are rarely invoked because
the offending governments normally agree to compensate the injured party in the form
of tariff reductions. Id. at 183.
44 See e.g., GATT, supra note 1, at art. XIX (the "escape clause" or "safe-
guards" provision); id. at art. XXVIII (modification or withdrawal of concessions); id.
at art. XXV:5 (waivers).
4 R. HUDEC, supra note 2, at 182-83.
46 Jackson, Governmental Disputes in International Trade Relations: A Propo-
sal in the Context of GATT, 13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 1, 5 (1979).
41 Id. From 1962-72 the contracting parties, except for the United States, virtually
abandoned use of GATT dispute settlement machinery. Use of the dispute process in-
creased in the years from 1973-77, and by the end of 1979, the dispute procedure had
"restored itself to a vigorous and broadly based level of activity." Hudec, supra note
30, at 181-82.
48 See LEUTWILER REPORT, supra note 2, at 102-03.
4 Jackson, supra note 46.
50 LEUTWILER REPORT, at 129-30; ITC Dispute Settlement Study, supra note 13,
at x.
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olution of disputes to the benefit of all Contracting Parties. '51
The Contracting Parties' principal complaints about the dispute
settlement procedure are the following: 1) long delays at each stage of
the process result in inefficient resolutions; 2) defendant countries can
too easily obstruct the process; 3) the panel procedure is riddled with
defects; and 4) the ability to ensure compliance with recommendations
is non-existent, rendering the process ineffective.52 Even in the U.S.
Dairy Quotas case, the one instance where the Contracting Parties au-
thorized retaliation, enforcement was not achieved: the United States
did not change its import quotas.
53
Complaints that specifically target the panel process focus on the
delays that occur in appointing panel members, setting the terms of
reference, 54 investigating the case, and issuing and adopting panel re-
ports.55 Because GATT relies on consensus decisionmaking, defendant
parties participate in the resolution of the dispute and are thus able to
prolong virtually every phase of the panel process.56 There is also con-
cern that panel decisions are politically motivated, since panels are
composed of "preferably governmental" individuals.57 Although panel-
ists are to be neutral when performing investigations and making deci-
sions, 58 in practice their positions at least indirectly reflect their govern-
ments' interests. Often underlying these complaints is the belief that
GATT should not rely on consensus decisionmaking, but should in-
stead utilize third party adjudication procedures.5" Proponents of the
consensus approach, on the other hand, argue that consensus decision-
making reduces the opportunity for politicization of the dispute, pre-
serves national sovereignty,"0 and promotes voluntary settlement, which
may shorten or actually eliminate the panel process.61
51 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, GATT AcTIvrrIEs 1986, 23
(1987) at 15 [hereinafter Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration].
52 E.g., ITC Dispute Settlement Study, supra note 13 at 71-72; Davey, supra note
19, at 65.
5 U.S. v. Netherlands, supra note 40; Davey, supra note 19, at 90 n.162.
Terms of Reference "set the question(s) that the panel is to address and the
substantive provisions to be considered, in addition to any other necessary points con-
cerning the procedures or timeframe to be used." They must "be accepted by the dispu-
tants before the panel can begin its work," creating an opportunity for delay. ITC
Dispute Settlement Study, supra note 13, at 77.
5 Davey, supra note 19, at 84.
ITC Dispute Settlement Study, supra note 13, at xii. For example, until re-
cently, South Korea consistently exercised its right to veto panel findings. N.Y. Times,
Nov. 13, 1989, at Dl, col. 6.
" Understanding, supra note 23, at 1 11.
58 Annex, supra note 16, at 6(iii). -
: See infra notes 137-47 and accompanying text.
so ITC Dispute Settlement Study, supra note 13, at 69.
*' Ehrenhaft, supra note 2, at 148.
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The United States provides an example of a major trading nation's
interference and noncompliance with GATT dispute procedures. In
1972, the EEC and Canada challenged the United States' Domestic
International Sales Corporations (DISC) legislation, which permitted
indefinite deferrals of taxes on export earnings. First, the parties
delayed the panel process for two and a half years because they could
not agree on the panelists.6 2 A panel finally issued four reports in 1977,
concluding that the DISC legislation violated the General Agreement."'
The Contracting Parties' 1981 decision based on the panel reports "ef-
fectively required the United States to repeal the law."" Only in 1985,
thirteen years after the complaint was filed, did the United States ac-
cept the panel's finding. When Congress did abolish the DISC legisla-
tion, however, it replaced it with the very similar Foreign Sales Corpo-
rations ("FSC") legislation. 5 GATT's dispute settlement mechanism
thus was not only time-consuming, but also ineffective. 6
The perception that the dispute settlement system cannot effi-
ciently, effectively or equitably handle trade disputes causes GATT
member countries to seek alternative solutions often outside, and incon-
sistent with the aims of, GATT."7 The longer an injured party must
wait to have a dispute resolved, the worse the damage incurred as a
result of the trade imbalance.68 Because under GATT the offending
nation can continue its nonconforming trade practice until the Con-
tracting Parties adopt the panel's recommendation and, even then, the
"' Comment, The GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure in the 1980s: Where Do
We Go from Here?, 5 DICK. J. INT'L L. 82, 91 (1986).
63 Id. at 92.
' Id.; GATT, Tax Legislation, BISD, supra note 1, at 114 (28th Supp. 1982).
" Ehrenhaft, supra note 2, at 148. See also GATT, U.S. Inports of Sugar from
Nicaragua, BISD 4/67; Davey, supra note 19, at 90 n.162 (in 1985, United States
ignored adverse panel decision concerning U.S. restrictions on sugar imports from
Nicaragua).
" With an eye to practical realities, the United States in November, 1989 moved
to conform to several GATT rulings. By complying with the recommendations of the
Contracting Parties, the United States hoped to establish binding rules that would be
advantageous to the U.S. in the future, when it anticipates being a plaintiff, instead of a
defendant, in GATT disputes. The United States desires to have a "stronger GATT to
take [the U.S.] side in future disputes." N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1989, at DI, col. 6.
67 In December, 1988 the United States announced the imposition of 100% import
duties, effective January 1, 1989, on various agricultural products imported from the
EEC in response to the EEC import ban on U.S. meat from hormone-fed cattle. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 29, 1988 at D12, col. 4. The U.S. claims that the EEC blocked U.S.
attempts to resolve the narrow issue of whether the hormones cause health hazards in
humans through the GATT dispute settlement process. The EEC wants discussion of
the dispute to include economic, scientific and consumer arguments, in addition to the
narrow scientific issue. Id.
"I Note, supra note 40, at 102-03.
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guilty nation does not always forsake its practices,"' injured parties pre-
fer to impose self-styled trade restrictions, so that their own injury will
be minimized and punishment of the offending parties assured.
7 0
These occurrences of procedural noncompliance instigated the uni-
versal desire of the contracting parties to modify GATT's dispute set-
tlement mechanism. Each instance of noncompliance fosters more un-
certainty in and further threatens the credibility of the overall system,"1
leading to further circumvention of the procedures.
72
2.3. Recent Solutions
One of the chief aims of the Uruguay Round is to strengthen
GATT's dispute settlement procedure. Although many participants be-
lieve the system cannot be strengthened without first eliminating the
ambiguity of the underlying rules in the General Agreement, there is
consensus that procedural modifications would bring some improve-
ment. The debate concerns the scale and direction of those modifica-
tions. The Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration, which launched the
Uruguay Round, guides the negotiations:
In order to ensure prompt and effective resolution of disputes
to the benefit of all contracting parties, negotiations shall aim
to improve and strengthen the rules and the procedures of
the dispute settlement process, while recognizing the contri-
bution that would be made by more effective and enforceable
GATT rules and disciplines. Negotiations shall include the
development of adequate arrangements for overseeing and
monitoring of the procedures that would facilitate compli-
ance with adopted recommendations."3
At the Uruguay Round midterm review meeting held in Montreal
in December 1988, the Contracting Parties agreed to procedures
designed to eliminate delays and facilitate the movement of disputes
through the dispute resolution machinery. They established time limits
69 Id. See also ITC Dispute Settlement Study, supra note 13, at 70.
70 For example, the United States often refused to accept GATT rulings, institut-
ing unilateral trade actions instead. N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1989, at D1, col. 6.
"1 See Progress Report of Oct. 18, 1988, supra note 11, at 1 (the economic down-
turn of the 1980s created disillusionment with GATT's ability to prevent or discourage
protectionist trade policies).
7 Procedures tend to become more compulsory when the parties see that they are
"helpful in resolving conflicting interests in an orderly and peaceful manner." R.
BALDWIN, BEYOND THE TOKYO ROUND NEGOnATIONS 19 (1979); see also Hoeller-
ing, Alternative Dispute Resolution and International Trade, 14 N.Y.U. Rav. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 785, 786 (1986).
" Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration, supra note 51, at 23.
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for the consultation and conciliation phases, and for each step in the
panel process." They streamlined the procedure by encouraging concil-
iation, good offices and mediation; allowing for optional arbitration; es-
tablishing a standard mandate for every panel; and permitting the Di-
rector-General to draw from a standing roster of panelists to quicken
panel selection, if necessary. 5 Both governmental and non-governmen-
tal individuals will now be able to serve as panelists, which should re-
duce the fear of political partiality. 8
3. TRADE IN SERVICES
Trade in services encompasses such fields as tourism, transporta-
tion, telecommunications, construction, financial services and profes-
sional services. 7 As of 1988, services trade accounted for approximately
one-fifth of the estimated $2.8 trillion volume of international trade,"8
and provided a major source of employment and revenue to industrial-
ized countries." According to a GATT report, trade in services grew
faster than merchandise trade in the 1980's." Yet, despite the economic
and political significance of services trade to most nations and the inter-
relationship between goods and services,81 no multilateral regime exists
to regulate it on an international scale.8 2 The General Agreement "was
designed particularly to apply to goods and was not intended to cover
services."" Consequently, contracting parties can impose barriers to
7" See generally Multilateral Trade Negotiations, supra note 14. For a more de-
tailed analysis, see infra notes 168-187 and accompanying text.
75 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, URUGUAY ROUND
PROGRESS REPORT (Dec. 14, 1988) 17-18 [hereinafter URUGUAY ROUND PROGRESS
REPORT of Dec. 14, 1988].
11 Multilateral Trade Negotiations, supra note 14, at 27.
7 Krommenacker, Trade-Related Services and GATT, 13 J. OF WORLD TRADE
L. 510, 511 (1979).
78 GATT estimated that the international volume of services trade reached $560
billion in 1988. N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1989, at D10, col. 6; Putting Services on the
Table:The New GATT Round, XXIII STAN. J. OF INT'L L. 13. The exact volume is
hard to measure. For example, the United States officially had $134 billion in nonmer-
chandise exports in 1985, of which $90 billion was simply income on U.S. assets
abroad. Levinson, Unfettering Trade in Services, ACROSS THE BOARD, Apr. 1987, at
24, 26.
79 R. BALDWIN, supra note 72, at 27. As of 1987, it was estimated that 75% of
the United States workforce and 50% of the United States gross national product was
dependent on the service sector. These figures understate the role of services in the U.S.
economy, however, because the value of many manufactured products are due to ser-
vices such as transport, design and marketing. Levinson, supra note 78, at 26.
80 N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1989, at D10, col. 6.
81 See Krommenacker, sypra note 77, at 510.
82 Rivers, supra note 78.
83 J. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 529. The one exception is Article VI, which
applies to cinematographic films. GATT art. VI; Bravender-Coyle, International
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services trade without violating the General Agreement. These barriers.
unavoidably affect free trade in goods." For example, transportation
and insurance are vital to trade in goods, so any discrimination in those
service sectors necessarily affects such trade.85 Proponents of trade in
services negotiations warn that the viability of GATT depends on its
ability to recognize the importance of the services trade and to develop
a framework of rules that will foster a stable international environment
for such trade.8 6
If the Contracting Parties cannot agree on a trade in services code,
a large portion of international trade will continue to be unregulated
and open to protectionist measures. Bilateral and regional agreements,
which necessarily discriminate against non-party countries, will fill the
gap; these accords will be outside the jurisdiction and supervision of
GATT.87 Further, to protect and promote growth of their service in-
dustries, countries might develop unilateral measures inconsistent with
GATT's overall objective of "removing distortions to the international
exchange of goods."88 An agreement on international regulation of ser-
vices trade is crucial if GATT is not to be rendered obsolete.89
The Contracting Parties recognized the need to discuss trade in
services as early as the 1950's9° and more recently at the Tokyo Round.
Trade in Services and the GATT, 13 AUSTL. Bus. L. REv. 217, 221 (1985). The side
agreements or "codes" developed during the Tokyo Round under GATT auspices also
deal with services, although to a limited extent. For example, the Agreement on Gov-
ernment Procurement covers services that are incidental to the supply of goods covered
by the agreement and which account for a cost less than the cost of the goods them-
selves. Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 11, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10,403,
18 I.L.M. 1052, at 1055 (entered into force 1/1/81).
8, Bravender-Coyle, supra note 83, at 220.
85 Id. at 219-20.
8 See, e.g., Schott, supra note 11, at 198; Ministerial Declaration, Nov. 1982,
GATT/1328, set out in BISD 29S/9 (1983); C. Yeutter, supra note 2, at 1 ("[T]he
future of the international trading system hinges on the outcome of th[is] ministerial
meeting [in Uruguay]").
817 HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 10. For example, the recently signed Canada-
U.S. bilateral free trade agreement contains binding rules applicable to a broad range
of trade in services. LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 2, Introduction, at 31. See also ITC
Dispute Settlement Study, supra note 13, at 83.
88 ITC Dispute Settlement Study, supra note 13, at vi.
89 See Sauvant, supra note 12, at 18 ("GATT needs to adjust to today's economic
realities; it must evolve, if it wishes to maintain its relevance."). At the Montreal
midterm review meeting held December 5-9, 1988, the contracting parties agreed to a
framework for negotiations on trade in services. The countries will strive to achieve
transparency, national treatment and "effective market access." The types of services to
be included were left to later negotiations. 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49 at 1619
(Dec. 14, 1988).
,0 Krommenacker, supra note 77, at 510. In 1953, the Contracting Parties in-
structed the Executive Secretary to prepare a report on the issues involved in discrimi-
nation in transport insurance which had been referred to the GATT by the U.N. Eco-
nomic and Social Council. Id. at 511.
1990]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
The Uruguay Round, however, represents the first multilateral forum
at which they are addressing services in depth. 1 The Uruguay Round
Declaration on services is broad in its mandate:
Negotiations in this area shall aim to establish a multilateral
framework of principles and rules for trade in services, in-
cluding elaboration of possible disciplines for individual sec-
tors, with a view to expansion of such trade under conditions
of transparency and progressive liberalization and a means
of promoting economic growth of all trading partners and
the development of developing countries. Such framework
shall respect the policy objectives of national laws and regu-
lations applying to services and shall take into account the
work of relevant international organizations. 92
Negotiating an agreement to cover world trade in services now is far
more complicated than was negotiating a goods agreement in 1947."
The nature and characteristics of the service trade are different from
that of goods, and the political and economic situations of the con-
tracting parties have changed dramatically in the past four decades.
Understanding the problems involved in negotiating a services agree-
ment is critical to anticipating the composition of a final agreement,
including its dispute settlement provision.
The disagreement among the Contracting Parties regarding
whether to have a services agreement under GATT indicates the basic
lack of common support behind an accord; negotiations over specific
provisions promise to be even more arduous. There are strong differ-
ences even among the code's proponents as to the desired coverage and
substance of the agreement's rules.94
The United States is the most vociferous proponent of a global
services agreement, followed by other developed nations such as Japan
and the European Economic Community. The "Group of Ten,"95
which represents lesser developed countries (LDCs), is the most vehe-
"I Schott, supra note 11, at 208. Services trade was not discussed during the To-
kyo Round because of the lack of detailed knowledge about the problems involved and
the complexity of the other issues on the agenda. BALDWIN, supra note 72, at 29. The
Tokyo Round did result, however, in several codes which augment the General Agree-
ment, some of which cover services trade to a limited extent. See infra note 127 and
accompanying text.
92 Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration, supra note 51, Part II, at 26.
93 See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
"' HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 10.
9" The "Group of Ten" consists of Brazil, India, Yugoslavia, Nigeria, Tanzania,
Cuba, Nicaragua, Peru, Argentina and Egypt. Veale, Spiegelman & Ronkainen, Trade
in Services: The U.S. Position, 11 FLETCHER 21, 21 (1987) [hereinafter Veale].
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ment opponent. The Group of Ten initially fought the inclusion of ser-
vices in the Uruguay Round talks.98 It feared that negotiations over
services trade would 1) inhibit the growth of the LDCs' infant and
unborn service industries;97 2) allow developed nations to link liberali-
zation of services trade with further liberalization of goods trade; 8 3)
deflect attention and resources from efforts to liberalize trade in
goods;99 and 4) "impinge on national security and sovereignty."
100
They are also generally uncertain as to where their long-term interests
in services trade lie."' 1 As part of a compromise reached at Punta del
Este between the opponents and proponents of services trade liberaliza-
tion, service trade issues are officially being negotiated outside of
GATT, separate from other GATT issues, but remain under the over-
all GATT negotiating committee established for the Uruguay
Round.10 ' Although this "separation may be more form than substance,
.. . [it reflects] the sharp divisions among the [Contracting Par-
ties].""0 The problem with this compromise is that the opposing par-
ties can choose not to incorporate the agreement into GATT after nego-
tiations end in 1990.104
While one easily can identify and quantify trade in goods, it is
hard to identify the nature and magnitude of the services trade, creating
an inherent difficulty in formulating a workable services agreement.1 0 5
For example, the United States government classifies services trade into
"' LDCs having more developed service sectors, such as Hong Kong and Singa-
pore, however, favor negotiations. Schott, supra note 11, at 211.
" The "infant industry" argument is based on the belief that LDCs' nascent ser-
vices sectors could not survive competition from the industrialized countries. Veale,
supra note 95, at 23. The trade barriers imposed by LDCs on their service sectors are
integrally linked to their policies for economic development, eclipsing any concern for
their restrictive impact on international trade in services. Schott, supra note 95, at 212.
", The economies of LDCs more directly depend on the export of goods than do
the economies of developed nations. In Defence of Open Multilateral Trade, supra
note 10, at 19. Further liberalization of foreign markets for their goods is one of the
LDCs' chief goals for the Uruguay Round. HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 10.
" HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 10.
100 Kalil, The Uruguay Round. An Interview with Ambassador Michael B.
Smith, 11 FLETCHER F. 13, 14 (1987).
101 HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 10.
102 Rivers, supra note 78, at 19-20. The negotiation on services is being per-
formed on the ministerial level and technically falls outside of the GATT structure. See
Recent Developments, supra note 2, at 204. GATT procedures and practices will ap-
ply to the services negotiations, however, and both the Group on Negotiations on Goods
and the Group on Negotiations on Services will report to the Trade Negotiations Com-
mittee, which has overall responsibility for the negotiations. See Punta del Este Minis-
terial Declaration, supra note 51, at 26-27.
1 HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 10.
104 See Aho, supra note 4, at 2.
105 Note, supra note 40, at 106, n.175.
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forty sectors, compared to the ten thousand categories available for
trade in goods."0 6 The measurement problem lies in the numerous defi-
nitions and heterogeneous nature of services."0 7 The frequently used
national accounting definition characterizes services as "all output not
derived from the goods-producing sectors."'0 8 The United States Trade
& Tariff Act of 1984 just as obliquely defines services trade as eco-
nomic outputs which are not tangible goods or structures.'09 It will be
very difficult for negotiators to fashion an agreement that contemplates
all aspects of the disparate services trade. As a result, the initial param-
eters of the agreement likely will be imperfect."'
Even where available, data on the magnitude of the services trade
is neither precise nor very comprehensive."' Services trade is often
under-reported to government agencies for various reasons, such as tax
avoidance." 2 International comparison and analysis of the data is diffi-
cult because every government and international organization measures
output differently."' While a "general feel" for the magnitude of the
services trade is sufficient for deliberations on non-tariff rules and on
codes of governmental conduct, more specific data is needed for both
tariff negotiations and for proper classification schemes." 4
The technological sophistication of service markets also makes
identification and data collection difficult. Unlike goods transactions,
many services transactions do not involve the physical crossing of bor-
ders, but instead are carried by telephone lines and satellites." 5 Regu-
lating international trade in services, therefore, will not be as simple as
regulating international trade in goods because trade in services tends to
be less "visible." Further, rapid technological advancement reduces the
time between development and introduction of new generations of ser-
vices. Rules governifng services trade must therefore be adaptable to fu-
ture markets, a difficult task to accomplish." 6
Another significant problem in designing a trade in services agree-
ment is the difficulty in recognizing the barriers to services trade and in
determining which ones are impermissible. Because services are sup-
106 Veale, supra note 95, at 24.
107 Id.
105 Note, supra note 10, at 377.
109 Veale, supra note 95, at 24. Yet another commentator defines services as gen-
erally those items which are "non-storable." HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 208.
110 See Levinson, supra note 78, at 28-30.
"' Schott, supra note 11, at 197.
112 Id.
113 Id. See also Note, supra note 10, at 374.
11, See Schott, supra note 11, at 198.
"1 Aho, supra note 4, at 5, 8.
116 Id.
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plied through a wider variety of means than are goods, more barriers
exist to trade in services than to trade in goods. Unfortunately, these
barriers tend to be less apparent than the tariff and quota barriers asso-
ciated with goods trade. Service barriers are the product of more subtle
administrative policies,""7 and thus they tend to be of the non-tariff
form. The obstacles to recognizing barriers to services trade will make
it difficult to fashion an initial agreement that will eliminate all, or
even many, existing barriers.
Finally, sanctions and barriers in the services trade are very much
issues of national sovereignty."1 8 For example, a government may es-
tablish a certain size shipping fleet for national defense purposes or a
national airline for prestige purposes. 19 Banking operations are ac-
tively regulated not only for prudential reasons, but also as instruments
of monetary and economic policy. 20 LDC's, in fact, view services as
central to national development."2 The contracting parties will be sub-
ject to constant domestic political pressure as a result of the importance
of service industries to national economic vitality. 22 It is very likely
that governments will choose to violate provisions of a services agree-
ment and ignore the disciplinary recommendations of the Contracting
Parties in favor of short-run national policy and domestic political
favor. 23 Trade in services is much more vulnerable than is trade in
goods to national policies that are inconsistent with the efficient alloca-
tion of international resources.
Given these difficulties, the initial trade in services agreement nec-
essarily will be both over- and under-inclusive, and modifications will
be necessary. The modifications would be made through further negoti-
ations and/or incrementally through resolutions of disputes. The dis-
pute mechanism must therefore be flexible enough to meet unforeseen
117 Note, supra note 10, at 374, 383. "Transparency" means identifiable, visible
and regularly administered procedures. Id. at 383 n.78. Typical barriers include: re-
strictions on right to establishment; discriminatory taxation and capital requirements;
restrictions on gaining professional accreditation; denial of visas; mandatory full or par-
tial local ownership of service firms; and discriminatory licensing regulations and fees.
Id. at 371-72 n.3; Schott, supra note 11, at 196, 207.
11 See Record of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Uruguay Round, Trade
Negotiations Committee Meeting at the Ministerial Level [hereinafter Ministerial
Level], Trade Negotiations Committee Doe. MTN.TNC/7 (MIN) at 41, 42 (Dec. 9,
1988).
11 R. BALDWIN, supra note 72, at 29.
"0 Schott, supra note 11, at 202; see also N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1989, at D3, col.
1. Countries often implement policies in a way that discriminates against foreign banks
and lessens competition in the financial services sector. Schott, supra note 11, at 22.
1 Sauvant, supra note 12, it 16.
'2' See Levinson, supra note 78, at 24. See also infra notes 157-59 and accompa-
nying text.
123 See Note, supra note 40, at 93.
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difficulties and to allow for continual shaping of the international
agreement.1 2 It must also be efficient; any delay in resolution of a dis-
pute will render the settlement ineffective.
4. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE FOR A TRADE IN SERVICES
AGREEMENT
While the key to successful dispute resolution lies primarily in
having an agreement that possesses clear substantive rules, sound dis-
pute resolution procedures promote adherence to those rules. 25 An ef-
fective dispute settlement mechanism is therefore necessary for any
trade in services agreement. The question is whether GATT rules
should be extended directly to such an agreement 26 or whether the
new agreement should provide for its own dispute procedures. Indepen-
dent procedures would likely be modeled after the General Agreement,
since the Agreement provides a useful framework for governmental
trade disputes. The dispute rules also will have to address the unique
problems of a service code.12 In answering this question, it is incum-
bent upon the negotiators to consider the special nature of the services
trade, the likely structure of the services agreement, and for the inade-
quacies of GATT's current procedures.'28
It has already been suggested that trade in goods differs from trade
in services so that simply applying current GATT dispute settlement
procedures without analysis to a services agreement would be inappro-
priate. 129 It would also be inappropriate simply to use the dispute set-
124 See Ministerial Level, supra note 118, at 41.
"2 R. BALDWIN, supra note 72, at 18; J. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 788 ("In the
long run, it may well be the machinery that is most important, i.e., the procedures,
rather than the existence of any one or another specific rule of trade conduct.") If one
party believes that the other parties will comply with the dispute settlement mechanism
and that the mechanism is fair, it will itself comply with the agreement. R. HUDEC,
supra note 2, at 270.
12 R. KROMMENACKER, WORLD-TRADED SERVICES: THE CHALLENGE FOR THE
EIGHTIES 7.5.2.2 (1985). Incorporating service disputes under the current procedures,
however, might overburden the already ineffective system. Veale, supra note 95, at 29.
127 Creating a separate dispute settlement mechanism for a code created under
GATT auspices is not a novel idea; the major Tokyo Round codes provide for their
own dispute procedures. See, e.g., Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note
83; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, BISD 26S/8. The provisions in these
codes generally follow GATT procedures. The main differences include stricter time
limits for completion of certain stages of the process and an unqualified right to have a
panel. See, e.g., Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, art. 14; Davey, supra note
19, at 60. Some critics have complained that this division of procedures is unnecessarily
complex and costly. Note, supra note 10, at 407. For a thorough analysis of the proce-
dures adopted, see Hudec, supra note 30, at 174-77.
128 Note, supra note 10, at 408-09.
129 See supra notes 105-24 and accompanying text. Current procedures include
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tlement system that was in effect when the General Agreement was
new, a system generally thought of as highly successful, based on the
rationale that the services agreement is also new. 30 For the reasons
outlined below, the same system would probably not be successful dur-
ing the early years of the services agreement.1"'
To be certain, some analogies can be drawn between the General
Agreement of 1947 and the proposed services code. Like the contem-
plated services agreement, the General Agreement was new, untested
and incomplete. It contained fairly rigorous legal rules and operated in
a highly uncertain political environment." 2 The tension between un-
certain politics and strict legal rules was resolved by developing the
flexible approach to dispute settlement that is currently used, 3 and by
giving the rules provisional, instead of formal, legal status.1 ' The cir-
cumstances surrounding the creation of the two agreements are criti-
cally different in several key respects, however. The power relation-
ships of the contracting parties have changed over the past four
decades, 35 trade relations are more complicated, services trade is more
complex than goods trade, and there does not exist a community inter-
est in, or a strong consensus behind, the creation of a services agree-
ment.13 Succinctly stated, the services agreement will be negotiated in
the modifications agreed to in Montreal. The agreement will not be formally adopted
until April, when the midterm review will resume to achieve an agreement on world-
wide agricultural trade reform. Until then, the agreement on dispute procedures is fro-
zen. 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1638 (Dec. 21, 1988).
130 J. JACKSON, supra note 2; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
1 See Davey, supra note 19, at 78.
132 It is likely that the Contracting Parties will adopt rigorous rules, such as
MFN treatment, simply because that is the structure to which they have become accus-
tomed in dealing with multinational trade. Further, vague rules and generalizations
will not be able to regulate services trade effectively.
113 See R. HUDEC, supra note 2, at 17, 270.
134 R. HUDEC, ADJUDICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES 29, 53
(1978).
"33 The Contracting Parties of GATT were small in number and a relatively ho-
mogenous group from 1947-58. See Davey, supra note 19, at 62. In 1947, GATT
leadership consisted of the United States on one side and a group of smaller, relatively
equal European nations on the other. With the formation of the EEC, the United
States lost its monopolization of the power base. R. HUDEC, supra note 2, at 264-65.
The addition of Japan as a powerful contracting party added a different perspective to
GATT, as did the increase in the number of LDC members and their formation of a
bloc commanding equal attention, if not equal power, from the developed nations. Id.
at 193.
18 Cf R. HUDEC, supra note 2, at 261 (tracing the historical demise of a consen-
sus among contracting parties); 0. LONG, supra note 3, at 88. From 1948-58, when
the GATT dispute settlement system functioned well, the General Agreement had only
recently been signed and there was a general consensus on how it should be interpreted.
Many government officials dealing with GATT had been involved in GATT's creation
and probably had a personal interest in its success. See HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at
81.
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a world devoid of the factors that contributed to the early success of
GATT's dispute settlement system.
When selecting a dispute settlement procedure, it is necessary to
determine which philosophical approach is the most appropriate for the
anticipated agreement. Dispute settlement procedures "can never be
considered in isolation from the substantive rules to which the proce-
dures [will] apply."1 37 There are two conflicting schools of thought on
how GATT and other multilateral trade agreements should approach
dispute settlement: one school favors a legalist or rule-oriented adjudi-
catory approach,"'8 while the other advocates a consensus approach that
encourages negotiated settlements. 1"9 GATT's current quasi-judicial
method contains a mixture of both approaches, but is generally thought
to be consensus-based. 4 The Understanding, the Annex, the 1982
Ministerial Declaration, and the new Montreal agreement emphasize
negotiation over adjudication; they all state that voluntary settlement
remains the most satisfactory form of dispute resolution.' 4'
Briefly stated, legalists advocate third party adjudication in which
written rules are applied objectively to disputed cases.' 42 The rules are
highly detailed, contemplating as much as possible every potential dis-
pute, and constitute formal legal obligations. 4 ' This approach is most
often urged by countries whose domestic justice systems are highly ad-
judicatory, such as the United States, ' 4 and by the LDCs. "Anti-legal-
ists" or "pragmaticists," while admitting that rules may provide valua-
137 Hudec, supra note 30, at 183.
138 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 46, at 1. See generally K. DAM, supra note 2, at
351-75. The approach is also referred to as "juridical."
"I See, e.g., 0. LONG, supra note 3; Phan van Phi, A European View of the
GATT, 14 INT'L Bus. LAW. 150, 151 (1986); Ehrenhaft, supra note 2, at 148. The
consensus approach is also called "pragmatic" and "antilegalistic."
"40 See LEUTWILER REPORT, supra note 2, at 129. For example, the detailed
procedural rules during the panel process calling for impartiality, time limits and the
exchange of written documents resemble a judicial system. Petersmann, supra note 29,
at 469-70. On the other hand, the consultation and conciliation requirements and the
panel's role in encouraging settlement exemplify GATT's antilegalist approach to dis-
pute resolution. Mounteer, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
and the Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention: A Critical Comparison of Arbitration Pro-
visions, 21 INT'L LAW. 989, 1006 (1987). As Professor Dam has noted, "legalism"
dominated the drafting of the General Agreement and some of the amendments, but
"pragmaticism" has governed its interpretation and administration. K. DAM, supra
note 2, at 4. GATT also has been characterized as having been more legalistic in its
approach to dispute settlement in its early years, and more antilegalistic in the years
before the Tokyo Round. Hudec, supra note 30, at 151. GATT art. XXIII mandates
neither approach.
141 Hudec, supra note 30, at 177.
142 See, id.
'4 See R. HUDEC, supra note 134, at 52; K. DAM, supra note 2, at 4.
144 See ITC Dispute Settlement Study, supra note 13, at 68.
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ble guidelines, favor informal consultation procedures in which conflicts
are resolved through negotiation and mutual agreement. Rules should
be avoided when possible, and adjudication should be a last resort . 4 5
The rules are not legally binding. Proponents of this school, such as
Japan and the EEC, note the complexity of the political, social and
economic forces involved in defining governmental trade policy, as well
as the futility of international rules in the face of such domestic
forces. 146 Further, if the rules had binding force, the parties would
agree only to the most trivial rules: rules so trivial that enforcement
would not even be necessary.
1 47
Although the General Agreement might be improved by strength-
ening the procedural rigor of its dispute settlement procedures, a ser-
vices agreement would benefit by adhering basically to the quasi-judi-
cial dispute resolution procedures currently used by GATT. The rules
should be designed to encourage a negotiated approach to dispute settle-
ment, using legalistic methods only to facilitate effective conflict
resolution.
The services agreement certainly will need the stability and pre-
dictability offered by a legalistic approach. Stability and predictability
help promote the common goals of an international agreement and en-
able nations to rely upon the legal rules of an agreement as being rep-
resentative of what to expect from other countries.1 48 The flexibility
and pragmaticism offered by an anti-legalist approach, however, are
more crucial for the services code because it is unlikely that the agree-
ment will enjoy the full support of its signatories. 1 9 Rigorous proce-
dures which force legal rulings where there is no consensus backing the
substantive rules will "lead trade disputes into unproductive channels
and could ultimately weaken the legal structure itself" through a loss of
confidence in the system."' In the absence of consensus and pressure to
conform, governments will tend to disregard international rules that
conflict with domestic policies.151 Where parties are not in consensus
over the substantive rules of an agreement, compliance with the agree-
145 See R. HUDEC, supra note 134, at 52; K. DAM, supra note 2, at 4.
146 Id. See also supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
147 See R. HUDEC, supra note 134, at 53.
148 J. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 755-56.
149 Flexibility and pragmaticism are necessary for reaching a compromise between
two conflicting interests when the normal legal processes are not useful and when it
preferable to avoid "legal technicalities." Id.
150 R. HUDEC, supra note 2, at 270. See also Phan van Phi, supra note 139, at
152.
151 See R. HUDEC, supra note 2, at 17 (ITO Charter had no real chance of pre-
vailing over stronger, conflicting domestic interests); see also 0. LONG, supra note 3, at
26.
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ment is best assured by using a flexible settlement approach involving
negotiation and compromise.' 52
Incorporating a flexible dispute settlement process into a services
agreement also may be necessary to obtain the signatures of the anti-
legalist countries.1 53 Contracting parties that are dissatisfied with the
dispute settlement procedure might refuse to approve the agreement or,
once enacted, refuse to abide by the agreement's terms.
The anti-legalist approach also provides the flexibility needed to
define new obligations of the services agreement through the dispute
settlement process.1 " Because of the inherent difficulty in crafting a
services agreement, many of its terms will be molded by the issues and
disputes that arise during the agreement's early years. Although the
dispute panels do not have authority under GATT to create new
rules,155 panels often create rules in practice which are adopted by the
Contracting Parties as a matter of course. So far, no member country,
has objected to this practice. Permitting the results of third party adju-
dication to stand as new law, without the Contracting Parties at least
having the option to reject the panel report, would be inconsistent with
a trade agreement based on the principle of consensus. 156 Further, since
"current" consensus constantly changes, a services agreement must al-
low for the flexibility needed to identify the consensus of the moment.
The use of an adjudicatory approach also is inappropriate because
it would impinge upon the sovereignty of the contracting parties.15
Where vital national interests such as defense are implicated, govern-
ments comply only with international rules and panel recommendations
with which they agree. The importance of the service sector to the
economies of many countries makes national policies regarding interna-
tional exchange of services particularly vulnerable to internal economic
and political pressures. Nations will disobey multilateral rules and ig-
nore panel decisions if overwhelmed by such domestic pressures.15
Thus, utilizing third party adjudication to resolve disputes likely will
152 0. LONG at 108. See also LEUTWILER REPORT, supra note 2, at 130.
11 Cf Berg, Trade in Services: Toward a "Development Round" of GATT Ne-
gotiations Benefiting Both Developing and Industrialized States, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J.
1, 30 (1987) (noting increasing power of "third world economic interests"].
18 See Davey, supra note 19, at 96-97. The approach is also valuable for deci-
sions that are novel or unexpected. Id.
18I Their authority extends only to interpreting existing rules. No panel or work-
ing party of GATT can extend or modify the rights and obligations of the parties. See
Phan van Phi, supra note 139, at 151.
16 See Hudec, supra note 30, at 196 ("[Hlaving been cast in a less rigorous form,
GATT rules must necessarily draw the major part of their authority from their consis-
tency with the norms and values current in the GATT community.").
8 5 R. BALDWIN, supra note 72, at 19.
18 For an example, see R. HUDE C, supra note 2, at 159, 161.
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lead to a high rate of non-compliance among losing parties. Non-com-
pliance will undermine the credibility of both the dispute settlement
procedure and the services agreement. A consensus-based approach
would provide the flexibility needed to resolve politically controversial
disputes successfully.
159
A legalist approach to dispute resolution also can overburden a
fragile agreement. By using a negotiation-based approach to dispute
settlement, GATT has been able to weather successfully numerous
strains and stresses on its agreement and organization over the past
forty years. The Contracting Parties intentionally emphasized negotia-
tion over third-party adjudication in recognition of the fragility of the
GATT structure. For example, during the first decade of GATT's ex-
istence, the members "took care not to put too much stress on [the frag-
ile GATT system] through overly aggressive use of the dispute settle-
ment system." ' At the Review Session of 1955, the members decided
not to institute the panel process, which is now in effect, citing the
excessive strain that formal establishment of judicial procedures would
place on GATT. 6' Likewise, during the tumultuous 1960's, when the
contracting parties had substantive problems with GATT and were ex-
periencing political pressure at home,16 2 the contracting parties settled
disputes primarily through negotiation rather than through the panel
process: GATT was probably too fragile to withstand the additional
pressure of a more adjudicatory dispute procedure.'6 The heated de-
bate over whether even to negotiate a multinational services trade
agreement indicates the inevitable fragility of any final services agree-
ment reached. An approach that allows for flexibility in administering
the agreement's rules would better ensure the survival of such a code.
It should be noted that the legalist approach to dispute settlement
has some merit in that it actually could facilitate negotiation processes.
The availability of third-party adjudication might discourage parties
from prolonging futile negotiations 64 or making spurious claims to jus-
159 See Jackson, supra note 46, at 9; Davey, supra note 19, at 97. See also R.
HUDEC, supra note 134, at 29; R. BALDWIN supra note 72, at 20.
180 Davey, supra note 19, at 62.
161 Annex, supra note 16, at 1 1, n.2. The panel procedure was codified in 1979,
when the system was thirty years old.
12 R. HUDEC, supra note 2, at 193, 195-97, 262. Triggered by the formation of
the EEC and new competition from non-Western countries, the contracting parties no
longer commanded a consensus about long-term goals. Additionally, some of the GATT
rules were regarded as outdated and incomplete. For example, the General Agreement
did not cover non-tariff barriers, which were as damaging to trade as tariff barriers.
The parties thus tended to ignore the dispute mechanism in favor of reaching diplo-
matic solutions. Hudec, supra note 30, at 152.
... Davey, supra note 19, at 79. See also, supra note 47 and accompanying text.
164 See Davey, supra note 19, at 69; R. HUDEc, supra note 134, at 28. Professor
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tify violations.1 1 5 In addition, "the existence of. . . adjudicative proce-
dures makes negotiations over rule violations more likely to succeed"
because binding rules provide reference points for the negotiators so
that the negotiations remain focused.' 6
Having argued that a trade in services agreement should take a
primarily anti-legalist approach to dispute settlement, the question re-
mains as to which of the GATT dispute procedures, if any, the drafters
should incorporate into a services code. These procedures include the
revisions made at the Montreal midterm review meeting.'1
7
The first step in the settlement process, bilateral consultation,
clearly should be adopted. Many disputes are resolved during this
stage; even the legalists favor the process. Any agreement reached
through bilateral consultation necessarily will be satisfactory to the par-
ties, resulting in a higher probability of compliance. At the Montreal
midterm review meeting, the delegates imposed time limits upon this
phase. The Montreal agreement requires that "unless otherwise mutu-
ally agreed, [a party must] reply to the [consultation] request within ten
days after its receipt and shall enter into consultations in good faitlr
within a period of no more than thirty days from the date of the re-
quest. . . .""' If the defendant party fails to comply with the time
restraints, the "contracting party that requested the holding of consulta-
tions may proceed directly to request the establishment of a panel or a
working party."'" 9 Further, if consultations fail to settle the dispute
within sixty days of the request for consultation, the complaining party
may request establishment of a panel or working party.'70 Prior to the
Montreal meeting, there was no set point after which a party could
abandon consultations.'" The Understanding only encouraged parties
to respond to requests for consultation "promptly" and to conclude dis-
Davey, an advocate of the legalist approach, claims that adjudication will not lead to
the end of all attempts at negotiation because negotiation would still remain the only
effective way to obtain compliance with the panel decision. Davey, supra note 19, at
69, n.74.
165 R. HUDEC, supra note 134, at 28.
166 Davey, supra note 19, at 77, n.101 (citing R. HUDEC, supra note 134 at 28-
29). See also J. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 766-67.
167 The new provisions are being applied on a trial basis until the end of the
Uruguay Round. Negotiations on further modifications will continue through 1990,
and a permanent decision on the provisions will be made before the end of the Round.
Ministerial Level, supra note 118, at 26.
16 Multilateral Trade Negotiations, supra note 14, at 25. In cases involving ur-
gent matters, such as perishable goods, consultations must begin within ten days. Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 See Understanding, supra note 23, at 6.
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cussions "expeditiously."*7 ' The new time limits add a degree of proce-
dural rigor that is needed for the services agreement to insure that dis-
putes are not ignored or stone-walled by powerful countries.
The Montreal delegates further emphasized their preference for
negotiated solutions by instituting a mediation option and by strength-
ening the conciliation and good offices procedures. These procedures
are optional and available at any point in the dispute settlement pro-
cess, even after the establishment of a panel or the issuance of recom-
mendations.17 1 Utilizing mediation or conciliation procedures does not
preclude a complaining party from later requesting a panel if media-
tion or conciliation proves unsatisfactory.17' The dispute procedure for
trade in services should also allow for mediation, conciliation and good
offices. These procedures encourage mutually satisfactory settlements.
Even when the parties do not reach voluntary settlements, mediation,
conciliation and good offices are helpful in narrowing the issues in
complex disputes.' 75 As a result, panels are able to decide fewer issues
and can submit recommendations more quickly.
The disadvantage of the mediation proposal, both in GATT and
in the new services code, is that it could present a further source of
delay in the dispute resolution process.' 76 The Montreal agreement is
silent as to the rules and structure of the procedure, giving the dispu-
tants maximum flexibility in designing the rules for their particular
dispute. 177 While this flexibility encourages mutually acceptable solu-
tions, it potentially subjects the mediation process to indefinite delay.
The parties may disagree over every step in the process, despite their
overall commitment to mediation. Highly structured procedures would
discourage delay.
The Montreal delegates also added an arbitration option to the
172 Id. at 4.
173 Multilateral Trade Negotiations, supra note 14, at 26. The text adopted in
Montreal leaves the mediation procedures to the discretion of the particular disputants.
Under the 1982 Ministerial Declaration, the parties were permitted to seek the good
offices of a third party at any time after consultations failed. Ministerial Declaration of
November 29, 1982, BISD 29S/9 at 14 (1983).
174 Multilateral Trade Negotiations, supra note 14, at 26.
' See Hoellering, supra note 72, at 791. In general, the EEC, Japan and
GATT officials, all advocates of the anti-legalist approach, prefer GATT to settle dis-
putes internally, rather than cede power to outside agencies. Comment, supra note 62,
at 98.
17' Davey, supra note 19, at 106.
'7 It has been suggested that the Director-General of the GATT would be best
suited to mediating disputes. See e.g., id.; Bliss, GATT Dispute Settlement Reform in
the Uruguay Round. Problems and Prospects, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 31, 51 (1987)
(summarizing the United States' proposals). Professor Jackson has proposed a detailed
structure of mediation. See Jackson, supra note 46, at 15-16.
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dispute resolution process as an alternative to the panel process. An
advantage of arbitration is that the arbitral award is final and binding
upon the disputants, without the approval of the Contracting Parties.
Further, since the arbitration rules, like the mediation rules, deliber-
ately were not set forth in the Montreal agreement, disputing parties
have complete autonomy in fashioning the process. Conversely, the
panel procedure is governed by formal rules. While the arbitration pro-
cess theoretically could be handled either internally by GATT or exter-
nally by an independent international administering agency, such as the
International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration, disputants
most likely will choose to have their controversy decided under GATT
auspices.'78
It would be imprudent to incorporate an optional arbitration pro-
cedure into the services dispute mechanism. Although, under GATT,
arbitration would be available only when the issues in dispute are
clearly defined and both parties agree to arbitration,7 9 it would be
dangerous to allow one, independent party to render a binding inter-
pretation of the new services trade rules, no matter how "clear" those
issues may appear. Even a compromise of non-binding arbitration, in
which the arbitrator's finding is not binding upon the parties but is
admissible in future actions,"' would not solve this problem. Experi-
ence in the international construction industry indicates that the threat
of admissibility encourages parties to accept the arbitration award."8 '
The award thus becomes defacto binding. As stated earlier, compliance
with the new agreement depends on the acceptability of its rules to the
signatories. A consensus approach best insures that new interpretations
are acceptable.
Although the panel process represents a more legalistic approach
to dispute settlement, it should be included in the services dispute settle-
ment mechanism. The Contracting Parties crafted the panel procedure
over a period of many years in response to GATT's inability to handle
trade disputes effectively. 82 The member countries reaffirmed the util-
ity of the procedure both at the Tokyo. 8 and Montreal meetings. In
Montreal, the members further modified the panel process in order to
minimize delays that had plagued the system, recognizing that the aim
of the panel process is to produce high quality reports in the shortest
176 See Hoellering, supra note 72, at 789.
179 Multilateral Trade Negotiations, supra note 14, at 26.
180 Hoellering, supra note 72, at 794. -
181 Id.
182 See Mounteer, supra note 140, at 1003-04.
181 See Hudec, supra note 30, at 170.
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time possible. 1 4 In addition, the Montreal negotiators set standard
terms of reference""5 and expanded the roster of experts available to
serve as panelists.1 "' All of these modifications encourage a more effi-
cient dispute resolution process.
Although this increased efficiency will heighten the legalism of the
dispute settlement process and place additional burdens on the proce-
dural structure, such changes are necessary to prevent the problems
that plague the current dispute procedure. Delays in processing dis-
putes have plagued GATT to such an extent that contracting parties
currently hesitate to use the dispute settlement system altogether."' 7
There is no reason to believe that disputants would not attempt to de-
lay settlement proceedings or that other administrative problems would
magically disappear under the services agreement. In fact, the underly-
ing disagreement over the creation of a services code suggests that par-
ties will employ dilatory tactics even more frequently. Because new ser-
vices are introduced into world trade at an increasingly rapid rate,
inordinate delays in dispute resolution will render decisions ineffective
and encourage injured parties to fashion remedies outside the multilat-
eral system.
1 88
Finally, the Contracting Parties will have to decide what legal sta-
tus to accord panel decisions under the services agreement. Under
GATT, the legal status of panel decisions is unclear: sometimes they
184 Multilateral Trade Negotiations, supra note 14, at 29.
Under the Understanding, the emphasis was merely on "prompt" action. See e.g.,
Understanding, supra note 23, at 11-12. Id. at 20. Panels were encouraged, for
example, to "deliver their findings without undue delay," but specific timeframes were
not set.
The Montreal agreement establishes a deadline for decisions in response to a
party's request for a panel; a twenty-day timeframe for the disputants' approval of the
panelists; and a one-week deadline for the panel to establish an overall timetable that
will remain in effect until the panel's first substantive meeting. Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, supra note 14, at 26-29. A panel report should be submitted to the dispu-
tants within six months of when the panel originally convened. Id. at 29. In cases
involving urgent matters such as perishable goods, the panels should aim to submit a
report to the disputants within three months. In no event can the "report process"
extend beyond nine months; historically, very few cases have required longer periods.
Id.; Understanding, supra note 23, at 1120, n.1. Finally, the entire panel process, from
the request for a panel until the Contracting Parties act on the panel report, cannot
exceed fifteen months unless the parties otherwise agree. Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions, supra note 14, at 30.
188 See supra note 54.
186 Multilateral Trade Negotiations, supra note 14, at 27.
1M7 See Uruguay Round Progress Report of Dec. 14, 1988, supra note 75, at 17.
But see Davey, supra note 19, at 84 (delay in processing disputes has not been a major
problem since the Tokyo Round; the entire process usually does not take longer than
eighteen months).
18 See Jackson, supra note 46, at 7. See also Wash. Post, Dec. 29, 1988 at E10,
col. 1.
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are given precedential status, but usually they are not." 9 Critics con-
tend that this muddled status results in panels and members spending
too much time dealing with issues previously resolved."9 ' On one hand,
requiring published reports of panel decisions and giving them prece-
dential weight for. future disputes would add to the juridical nature of
the process. On the other, established precedent would aid disputants
by enabling them to base their negotiating positions on reasoned predic-
tions about the outcome of a case if it were to proceed to adjudica-
tion.""' Precedent would also aid in rounding out the less than compre-
hensive rules of a new services code, adding structure to the agreement.
Functionally, panel findings would provide and interpret rules for fu-
ture disputes. Additionally, case precedent is less binding than formal
rules. While future panels can overrule decisions that later become in-
appropriate, only the Contracting Parties acting in consensus have the
authority to amend rules.
Overall, the provisions developed in Montreal reaffirm the Con-
tracting Parties' reliance on negotiation, and they generally could be
incorporated into a services dispute mechanism. Voluntary settlement
and consensus appropriately remain the touchstones of the dispute reso-
lution process. 92 Despite firmer time deadlines, the disputing parties
retain the flexibility to prolong the consultation process: panels are not
mandatory but, if used, the participants or the panel can extend the
new time restraints on the panel process.' The Montreal modifica-
tions generally focus on minimizing procedural delays. Incorporating
the panel procedure, time deadlines and use of case precedent into an
otherwise consensus-based approach to dispute resolution would pro-
vide the legalism necessary for the efficient functioning of the dispute
process. Additional adjudicative techniques and rules would overburden
the dispute process and prevent the negotiated solutions essential to the
survival of the trade in services agreement.
5. CONCLUSION
The highly charged environment surrounding the creation of a
services trade agreement, the unique characteristics of services trade,
1:9 Davey, supra note 19, at 105 & n.221.
1 0 ITC Dispute Settlement Study, supra note 13, at 73. Detailed reports of
GATT disputes are not always published, and the "Understandings" that are some-
times issued lack useful interpretive language. Id.
191 Jackson, supra note 46, at 9. Less powerful nations do not want detailed re-
ports to be accorded precedential weight, especially in complex cases.
192 See Multilateral Trade Negotiations, supra note 14, at 25-26.
193 See generally id.
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and the problems of the existing GATT dispute settlement mechanism
dictate that negotiation and consensus be the central components of a
dispute settlement procedure for a services trade agreement. It is of
overriding importance that the dispute settlement procedure remain
flexible while the new agreement is tested by the trading system. An
anti-legalist approach to dispute resolution would provide this neces-
sary flexibility. Recent experience in GATT makes clear, however, that
this approach cannot adequately address persistent delays in the dispute
resolution process. Incorporation of both the panel process and the
timetables adopted in Montreal would expedite the process. In sum, a
multilateral trade in services agreement will have a better chance of
success if it includes a dispute settlement procedure that emphasizes
conciliation and voluntary settlement, but retains enough formal char-
acteristics to ensure that the system functions efficiently and effectively.
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